OnionShare 2.5 - en to af translation catalogue (11 entries)

en: Security Design
af: Beveiligingsontwerp

en: Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works.
af: Lees eers :ref: `how_it_works` om ’n idee te kry oor hoe OnionShare werk.

en: Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities.
af: Soos alle programmatuur kan OnionShare goggas of kwesbaarhede bevat.

en: What OnionShare protects against
af: Waarteen OnionShare beskerm

en: **Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your computer. When sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to any third-party server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a server for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust the computers of others.
af: **Derdepartye het nie toegang tot enigiets wat in OnionShare gebeur nie.** Gebruik van OnionShare beteken dat dienste direk op u rekenaar gehuisves word. Wanneer u u lêers met OnionShare deel word dit nie na ’n derdepartybediener opgelaai nie. Indien u ’n OnionShare-kletskamer skep, dien u rekenaar as bediener daarvoor ook. Dit vermy die tradisionele model waar ander se rekenaars vertrou moet word.

en: **Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using the onion service's private key.
af: **Netwerk-afluisteraars kan nie spioeneer op enigiets wat onderweg in OnionShare gebeur nie.** Die verbinding tussen die Tor-oniondiens en Tor Browser is eind-tot-eind geënkripteer. Dit beteken dat netwerkaanvallers niks kan afluister nie behalwe geënkripteerde Tor-verkeer. Selfs as ’n afluisteraar ’n kwaadwillige rendezvous-knooppunt is wat gebruik word om die Tor Browser met die oniondiens van OnionShare te verbind, word die verkeer met die oniondiens se privaat sleutel geënkripteer.

en: **Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor Browser users, the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the identity of the OnionShare user.
af: **Anonimiteit van OnionShare-gebruikers word beskerm deur Tor.** OnionShare en die Tor Browser beskerm die anonimiteit van gebruikers. Solank die OnionShare-gebruiker die OnionShare-adres anoniem met Tor Browser-gebruikers kommunikeer, kan Tor Browser-gebruikers en afluisteraars nie die identiteit van die OnionShare-gebruiker nie agterhaal nie.

en: **If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. To access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made public by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`).
af: **Indien ’n aanvaller van die onion-diens te wete kom, het hulle steeds toegang tot niks.** Vorige aanvalle teen die Tor-netwerk om onion-dienste op te noem, het aanvallers toegelaat om privaat ``.onion``-adresse te ontdek. Om toegang tot ’n OnionShare-diens d.m.v. sy adres te verkry, moet die privaat sleutel wat vir klantstawing gebruik word, geraai word (tensy die diens reeds openbaar gemaak is deur die privaat sleutel te deaktiveer -- sien "ref"`turn_off_private_key`).

en: What OnionShare doesn't protect against
af: Waarteen OnionShare nie beskerm nie

en: **Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be secure.** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an e-mail message monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is being used. Eavesdroppers can access services that are still up by loading their addresses and/or lost key in the Tor Browser. Avoid this by communicating the address securely, via encrypted text message (probably with disappearing messages enabled), encrypted e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something that isn't secret.
af: **Bekendmaking van die OnionShare-adres en privaat sleutel is dalk onveilig.** Om die OnionShare-adres aan mense te kommunikeer is die verantwoordelikheid van die OnionShare-gebruiker. Indien dit onveilig verstuur is (soos deur ’n e-posboodskap wat deur ’n aanvaller dopgehou word), kan ’n luistervink vasstel of daardie OnionShare-gebruik word. Luistervinke kry toegang tot bedieners wat loop deur hul adres en/of verlore sleutel in die Tor Blaaier te laai. Vermy dit deur die adres veilig te kommunikeer d.m.v. geënkripteerde teksboodskap (waarskynlik met verdwynboodskappe geaktiveer), geënkripteerde e-pos of in persoon. Dit is onnodig wanneer OnionShare vir iets wat nie geheim is nie, gebruik word.

en: **Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only accessed over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless anonymity is a goal.
af: **Bekendmaking van die OnionShare-adres en privaat sleutel is dalk nie anoniem nie.** Ekstra voorsorg moet getref word om te verseker dat die OnionShare-adres anoniem gekommunikeer word. ’n Nuwe e-pos- of kletsrekening wat slegs oor Tor bereik kan word, kan gebruik word om die adres te deel. Dit is onnodig tensy anonimiteit ’n doel is.
